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Grounding Confucian Moral Psychology in Rasa Theory: A Commentary on Shun Kwong-loi’s 
“Anger, Compassion, and the Distinction between First and Third-Person” 
Abstract 
Shun Kwong-loi argues that the distinction between first- and third-person points of  view 
does not play as explanatory a role in our moral psychology as has been supposed by 
contemporary philosophical discussions. He draws insightfully from the Confucian tradition 
to better elucidate our everyday experiences of  moral emotions, arguing that it offers an 
alternative and more faithful perspective on our experiences of  anger and compassion. 
However, unlike the distinction between first- and third-person points of  view, Shun’s 
descriptions of  anger and compassion leave unarticulated what would be necessary to 
differentiate these responses from non-moral responses. Here, I make a friendly suggestion 
on how this explanatory gap might be filled, providing complementary grounding for Shun’s 
observations by way of  K. C. Bhattacharyya’s phenomenological analysis of  feeling. It fills 
the gap by means of  a gradation in the possible depth of  emotional responses found in the a 
priori structure of  a feeling experience for any subject. The payoff  of  such a comparison 
between Shun’s explication of  Confucian moral psychology and Bhattacharyya’s explication 
of  rasa theory is not only a possible phenomenological grounding for the former but also a 
potential way to articulate a missing ethics in Bhattacharyya’s thought. 
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1. Introduction 
In “Anger, Compassion, and the Distinction between First and Third-Person,” Shun Kwong-loi 
critiques a longstanding psychological distinction between the first- and third-person points of  view, 
commonly found in contemporary philosophical discussions of  emotional responses (hereafter, 
“Distinction”). According to this, there are two distinct kinds of  responses that fall into first-person and 
third-person categories: the first-person point of  view concerns the response of  someone directly 
involved in a given situation, such as resentment in the case of  anger; while the third-person point of  
view concerns that of  someone not directly involved, such as indignation—the latter being understood 
as ‘generalized or vicarious analogues’ of  the former [Strawson 1962, 15, cited in Shun forthcoming]. 
However, Shun argues that this distinction between points of  view does not play as sufficiently 
explanatory a role in our moral experiences as has been supposed. He draws insightfully from the 
Confucian tradition to elucidate a range of  everyday experiences of  moral emotions, arguing in 
particular that it offers alternative and more expansive articulations of  such varied experiences of  anger 
and compassion. Resentment and indignation insufficiently characterise a rich plethora of  moral anger 
responses, which are based on the various aspects of  a situation salient for someone S who is 
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responding to it. And the distinction between first- and third-person points of  view would be at best 
understood as an artificial line drawn across a continuum of  how S might feel related to those involved 
in the situation, which would still only be one aspect of  the situation (hereafter, “Continuum”).  
Yet, part of  the appeal of  Distinction (especially in its Strawsonian form) was that it offered a 
straightforward way to ground the difference between moral and non-moral responses in our shared 
psychology: first-person responses are non-moral, while third-person ones are moral. In this 
commentary, inspired by Shun’s discussion and hoping to expand it, I would like to make a friendly 
suggestion for a possible way that his account may also ground this moral/non-moral difference, while 
doing so at a more fundamental level: in the a priori structure of  feeling experiences. I do by locating 
Continuum within the framework of  K. C. Bhattacharyya’s phenomenological analysis of  feeling. This 
engagement not only offers Continuum a possible grounding for the moral/non-moral difference, but 
also points towards how to articulate an otherwise missing ethics in Bhattacharyya’s thought. 
2. Explanatory Demands for Continuum 
Under Distinction, there are two corresponding kinds of  emotional responses thought to be 
fundamentally different in nature: in P. F. Strawson’s extremely influential account, only responses from 
the third-person point of  view (such as indignation), in virtue of  their ‘impersonal or vicarious 
character,’ would qualify as moral responses [Strawson 1962, 15]. Responses understood as pertaining 
only to the first-person point of  view, such as gratitude, are accordingly non-moral. One implication of  
Continuum is an enlarged domain of  moral responses that would include, pace Strawson, emotional 
responses such as gratitude. Having a larger domain of  moral responses might be seen as a strength of  
Continuum, in that it better captures certain everyday assessments of  agents as being more or less moral 
even in relation to their responses to situations in which they are directly involved. After all, as the 
Confucians and Adam Smith that were cited by Shun had observed, we ordinarily deem an agent who 
responds with a lack of  gratitude, or even ingratitude, to an act of  goodwill to be morally problematic 
or perhaps even liable to certain blaming responses. 
However, one intuitive pull of  Distinction was that the psychological character of  moral experience was 
distinguishable from non-moral ones: emotional responses were moral in virtue of  a common feature 
in such experiences—that is, a third-person point of  view. While this might have excluded responses 
such as gratitude, it also excluded metacognitive responses such as the Aha! Experience—that is, an 
individual’s response to their becoming aware of  a proposition being true (Dorsch 2016)—or aesthetic 
responses such as the terrible feeling when we behold Goya’s painting Saturn Devouring His Son. Under 
Shun’s current presentation of  Continuum, it is unclear what aspects of  our experiences could be the 
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basis of  ruling out something like the Aha! Experience or a feeling in response to an artwork, while 
maintaining anger and compassion as moral responses. This is especially so since he understands 
‘situation’ so broadly as to ‘include occurrences and happenings, someone’s being in a certain condition, 
someone’s doing something, or just any state of  affairs’ [Shun forthcoming]. A proponent of  Continuum 
could possibly accept that the moral domain subsumes responses that are otherwise ordinarily 
understood to be non-moral (and perhaps exclusively epistemic or aesthetic), or accept that there is an 
explanatory demand for Continuum to account for the moral nature of  responses such as anger and 
compassion. Yet, even if  one were tempted to accept the former (taking in account the Confucians’ 
moralised and aestheticised emphasis on learning), there remains a need to characterise the moral in at 
least some minimal way—a necessary condition—that does not render it an empty designator for any 
response to any given situation. 
Furthermore, Shun’s psychological observations are based on Confucian texts and the ways in which we 
speak of  emotional responses in the English language today. While they might be astute and 
heuristically useful, it would be inadequate to simply extrapolate from these to a universal claim about 
human moral experience. It would seem just as plausible under Continuum, as it currently stands, that 
some language users would not necessarily find Shun’s examples of  how we speak of  emotional 
responses familiar or convincing: one can easily imagine a particularly philosophical breed of  
anglophones (especially in certain British departments) that are so smitten with Distinction that 
‘expressions [of  compassion] such as “I am pained and distressed by what happened,” or “I cannot 
bear to see this outcome”’ are understood only if  reduced to expressions of  ‘“sympathy,” “empathy,” 
“projective imagination,” or “perspective taking”” [Shun forthcoming]. More than a worry concerning 
psychologism about morality, such an extrapolation cannot also support Shun’s [ibid.] own intention for 
Continuum ‘to be applicable not just to the Confucian position, but to these familiar experiences [of  
anger and compassion] as such.’ That is, in order for Continuum to go beyond contingent (albeit shared) 
linguistic expressions of  anger and compassion, there is a need to account for how Continuum would 
hold for any individual experiencing such responses and not just for Confucians and most anglophones. 
To sum, a robust account of  Continuum must thus satisfy the two explanatory desiderata of  differentiation 
and universality, otherwise met by Distinction: 
(i) Differentiation: An account of  responses must provide some necessary condition of  moral   
  responses that excludes at least some non-moral responses. 
(ii) Universality: An account of  responses must hold for all individuals. 
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3. Phenomenological Grounding 
A possible way for Continuum to meet these desiderata is by turning to Bhattacharyya’s analysis of  the 
concept of  rasa (often translated as “savour” or “taste”), understood as ‘feeling par 
excellence’ [Bhattacharyya 1930, 195]. This would allow Continuum to satisfy differentiation, by means of  a 
gradation of  responses, and universality, given that the gradation is meant to be an a priori structure that 
holds for all experiences of  feeling. 
Bhattacharyya’s analysis furnishes us with three grades of  feeling: primary, sympathetic, and contemplative, 
all of  which may occur simultaneously in a feeling individual S and may be found in our responses to 
any given situation (not just artworks).  As will be clear, “sympathetic” here is not used in the sense 1
avoided by Shun—that is, ‘understood in terms of  one’s responding from a “third-person perspective” 
on harm to another party out of  a concern for the other party’s well-being’ [forthcoming]. In primary 
feeling, S has a response in a particular situation, where what is salient in S’s experience is a particular 
object identified with the feeling. In sympathetic feeling, S feels the particular primary feeling of  
someone Sʹ in a particular situation (who may be S themselves or imaginary as in an artwork), where 
what is salient in S’s experience is the particular primary feeling and the situation Sʹ is in (including any 
particular relation S has to Sʹ). A sympathetic feeling may thus be understood as a response to a 
particular situation involving an Sʹ. In contemplative feeling, S feels feeling as such, where what is 
salient in S’s experience is the feeling sans particularities. It is a further deepening of  sympathetic feeling 
into the contemplative grade, through aestheticisation, that transforms the experience into one of  rasa. 
A contemplative feeling is a response independent of, yet arising out of, a particular situation, S themselves, 
and the object. For example, consider how our enjoyment of  the rasa of  the Furious (raudram) emerges 
from the constituents of  the play and our sympathetic response to Medea’s situation in Euripides’ play: 
as we behold Medea in her golden chariot at the end of  the play, we enjoy the Furious as an ‘idealised 
feeling’ which exists independently of  the play and our response [Bhattacharyya 1930, 199].  2
Shun’s descriptions of  anger and compassion may be understood as responses lying between the first 
two, non-aesthetic grades of  primary and sympathetic feelings under the above analysis. Let us first 
 These three grades also map onto the traditional distinction in Indian aesthetics between transitory emotions 1
(vyabhicharibhava), stable or durable emotions (sthayibhava), and rasa, with the classic formulation of rasa in the 
Natyashastra being: ‘[r]asa arises from the conjunction of factors [vibhava], reactions [anubhava], and transitory 
emotions [vyabhicharibhava]’ [N 6.31]. What is crucial for Continuum here is that this conjunction of factors, reactions, 
and transitory emotions (primary feelings) constitutes a situation (rather than an object) to which one responds with a 
stable emotion (sympathetic feeling). Accordingly, Arindam Chakrabarti translates “vibhava,” “anubhava,” and 
“vyabhicharibhava” as ‘situational causal inputs,’ ‘expressive outputs,’ and ‘transient feelings’ [Chakrabarti 2010].
 Rasa theory traditionally lists thirty-five transitory emotions, seven stable emotions, and seven rasas, but there are 2
longstanding debates in psychology about whether there are basic emotions and what they might be [cf. Eickers, Loiza, 
and Prinz 2017]. Even so, neither Bhattacharyya nor Shun need to commit to any position on this issue.
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turn to these in the various anger responses in Shun’s driving example. Where S is a driver endangered 
by the reckless driving of  another, what would be salient in S’s primary anger (resentment) would be 
that of  having their worthiness challenged, identified with the reckless driver’s action as the object. 
What would be salient in the sympathetic anger, on the other hand, would then be S’s feeling of  their 
own primary anger within the context of  the wider driving situation. Notably, S’s sympathetic anger 
(indignation) is detached from particularities of  driver’s reckless action as it is valenced in S'’s primary 
anger. S responds to the situation in which the fact that S' is also S is merely one element being 
responded to, such that S’s response pertains principally to the situation as such. In this way, S would 
‘still acknowledge that the offending act contains an implicit “insulting message,” but in the same 
manner as [S] would if  the victim were a stranger’ [Shun forthcoming]. Where Sʹ is not S, differential 
relations would entail differential responses. Nevertheless, the response to the situation remains at the 
sympathetic grade. Anger that “resides in the self ” would thus be when primary anger is predominant, 
whereas anger that “resides in things” would be when sympathetic anger is predominant. This, as in 
Continuum, does not require the fundamental positing of  a distinction between first- and third-person 
points of  view. Just as Shun [ibid.] describes the ‘progression’ of  responding increasingly with anger 
that “resides in things” as opposed to “in the self,” the deepening of  anger from the primary to 
sympathetic grade is also one that comes with ‘increasing age and experience.’ 
Turning now to compassion, we may perhaps more straightforwardly understand compassion to be a 
sympathetic feeling, in as much as it involves S’s response to Sʹ’s primary hurt feeling in response to a 
harm. Again, where Sʹ is not S, differential relations would entail differential responses. Notably, 
sympathetic feelings are both intimate and unmediated (in the senses used by Shun). They are intimate in 
that, as we saw before, S responds to the situation in which the fact that Sʹ is also S is merely one 
element being responded to, and this fact alone does not change the relevant kind of  response to the 
situation. They are unmediated in that they arise upon S’s ‘coming to be aware of  the situation, without 
being further explained by some other kind of  concern’ [Shun forthcoming]. This is because 
sympathetic feelings (such as compassion), regardless of  whether or not it is directed at a situation 
where S is also Sʹ, do not differ in their object (of  harm) in the primary feeling (of  hurt), which part-
constitutes the situation in focus and causally underlies feeling at the deeper grades. But whereas anger 
would be morally underdeveloped where the primary feeling and its object are predominant in 
experience, compassion would be morally underdeveloped where the relation (or lack thereof) between 
S and Sʹ is predominant. With underdeveloped compassion, the relation would be predominant in 
experience in contexts such as the special Confucian ones listed by Shun [ibid.], ‘vivid presentation 
[where the relation between S and Sʹ is one of  imagined identity], close relationship, [and] sense of  
accountability’; but the lack of  relation would be predominant in experience in relation to distant 
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suffering across the globe. Hence, these different forms of  moral responses, anger and compassion, are 
underdeveloped in as much as they involve ‘overemphasizing oneself ’ or ‘underemphasizing others,’ 
respectively [Shun 2020, 423]. 
Now that we have located Shun’s psychological observations within Bhattacharyya’s analytical 
framework, we can now better see how the gradation of  feelings affords us the required differentiation 
between moral and non-moral responses. Responses such as anger that “resides in things,” compassion, 
or gratitude share a common experiential structure in that they are all of  the sympathetic grade. Rather 
than being moral because they view as if  from a removed, third-person vantage point, such responses 
can be said to be moral in as much as they meet a necessary condition of  S responding to S' within a 
given situation and under a certain primary feeling (often duress)—which may be differentially inflected 
by the differential relation between S and Sʹ. This, however, is not a sufficient condition: S, for example, 
may be amused at a primary frightful feeling of  their own. Conversely, responses such as anger that 
“resides in the self ” or the Aha! Experience share a common experiential structure in that they are of  
the primary grade. As discussed above, anger that “resides in the self ” is only primary, since what is 
salient in an experience of  it is a particular object identified with the feeling. Meanwhile, as a 
metacognitive feeling, the Aha! Experience is not of  the sympathetic grade because it responds not to 
another feeling but a cognition. The gradation, further, allows Continuum to more specifically 
differentiate moral from aesthetic responses. The terrible feeling in response to Goya’s painting or the 
rasa of  the Furious in response to Euripides’ play both share a common experiential structure in that 
they are all of  the contemplative grade. Since feeling at such a grade is devoid of  the particularities of  
either S or Sʹ and whatever relation that may exist between them, it cannot be said to be moral. 
Since the threefold gradation of  feeling is found in the structure of  our experiences of  feelings as such, 
locating Shun’s contingent psychological observations within a phenomenological framework also 
serves to undergird his claims (from Confucian texts and most anglophone experiences) with an a priori 
account of  any feeling experience—satisfying his own aspiration to universality. That is, as an a priori 
structure, the gradation of  feelings—and hence Continuum—would hold for any feeling subject, since it 
underlies all experiences of  feeling. Thus, even if  the aforementioned particularly philosophical breed 
of  anglophones were to insist on finding familiar only linguistic expressions of  Distinction for, say 
compassion, we now have positive reason to think that they do not present psychological experiences 
that are counterexamples to Shun’s observations so much as exceedingly narrow uses of  language. 
Bhattacharyya’s phenomenological analysis of  feeling therefore provides an attractive way for Continuum 
to satisfy the two explanatory desiderata, differentiation and universality. 
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4. Future Orientations 
In contemporary scholarship in philosophy and psychology, there are few instances of  comparisons 
between Chinese and Indian non-Buddhist traditions—and fewer still on emotions.  This is woefully 3
unfortunate, given the resonances between how feelings are discussed in the Confucian tradition and 
rasa theory, as I have suggested above. And more still can be drawn from the comparison I have only 
briefly made here. For example, in attending to the contemplative grade of  feeling, we find a new 
distinction in points of  view: not a moral one between first- and third-persons as in Distinction but an 
aesthetic one between the particular feeling individual and idealised aesthete (referred to by 
Bhattacharyya as the “Heart Universal” [sahrdaya]). In rasa theory more broadly, it is the connoisseur 
[rasika or ‘one of  taste’] who progresses to be able to feel as the idealised aesthete alongside the artist, 
‘thanks to, among other things, [the rasika’s] study of  literature’ (Abh 1.281). And this echoes the Neo-
Confucian Zhu Xi’s frequent exhortations to his reader to “savour [wanwei or zhiwei]” the Confucian 
classics (particularly the Odes) in order to refine their heart-mind [xin], shared by both authors (the 
sages) and reader, to become familiar with pattern-principle [li]: 
Now that I have glossed the Odes, it has been explained and thus is easily comprehensible. 
But there is still the need to seriously recite and chant, savoring the taste of  the moral 
pattern-principles, and chew on the flavor before one can gain [from reading it]. If  you read 
the Odes cursorily and stop after only two or three days, not only will you not get the flavor 
but [you will] also forget [what you have read], so nothing is accomplished. The ancients said 
the Odes rouses the emotions, so you have to read in such a way that emotions are roused. 
Only then are you reading the Odes. If  there is no such arousal, you are not reading the Odes. 
[Ng trans. 2019, 89] 
That is, for Zhu, the contemplative grade of  feeling is a necessary aspect of  reading, which is itself  ‘one 
task in the investigation of  things [gewu yishi]’ [Ng trans. 2019, 75]. 
Admittedly, it is not necessary for Continuum to satisfy differentiation and universality by means of  a 
Bhattacharyyan detour. I anticipate Shun [cf. 2020] might be able to furnish a similar account from a 
phenomenological explication of  the Neo-Confucian idea of  “one body.” But the payoffs of  this 
present comparison between Shun’s explication of  Continuum and Bhattacharyya’s explication of  rasa 
theory is not only one possible way of  providing phenomenological grounding for the former. 
Bhattacharyya’s oeuvre is often thought to be curiously missing an ethics, and dialogue with the 
Confucians seems to promise one possible way of  articulating what this missing ethics might look like. 
For example, we would be able to explicate from the above how non-moral responses can have a role in 
 For a discussion pertaining to the state of philosophical scholarship on Chinese and Indian non-Buddhist traditions, see 3
Mcleod 2018; for a very broad, survey-level discussion of the relation between rasa and savouring [wei] in the 
psychology of emotion, see Sundararajan 2010.
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our moral lives: particular metacognitive responses at the primary grade may draw our attention to 
values [cf. Chappell 2019] and aesthetic responses at the contemplative grade may better sensitise us 
non-egoistically to morally relevant feelings [cf. Chakrabarti 2010]. At the very least, I hope to have 
expressed an interest, from the point of  view of  Indian aesthetics, in Shun’s critique of  Distinction and 
an open invitation for him and similar Confucian-inspired philosophers to engage in dialogue with the 
rasa theorists. 
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